A neighbor's trust based model for prevention of black hole attack in wireless modile ad hoc networks by Araghi, Tanya Koohpayeh,
  
A NEIGHBOR’S TRUST BASED MODEL FOR PREVENTION OF 
BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN WIRELESS MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
 
 
 
TANYA KOOHPAYEH ARAGHI 
 
 
 
A prject submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the award of the degree of 
Master of Computer Science (Information Security) 
 
 
Advanced Informatics School 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
 
 
JUNE 2013  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that this thesis entitled “A Neighbour’s Trust Based Model for Prevention of 
Black Hole Attack in Wireless Mobile Ad Hoc Networks “is the result of my own 
research except as cited in the references. The thesis has not been accepted for any 
degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature of any other degree. 
 
 
 
 
Signature: .................................................... 
Name: Tanya Koohpayeh Araghi 
Date: JUNE 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to 
My beloved parents, my dearest siblings, and to all whom were beside me 
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
It is almost difficult for me to give enough thanks to all the people who have 
contributed to this study at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia as it was to write this 
thesis. 
I am very fortunate to have had Dr. Mazdak Zamani as my supervisor. I am 
deeply indebted to him whose guidance, inspiration, and suggestions helped me 
finish this work. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to him. I appreciate 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, and Advanced Software Engineering Faculty of 
Computer Science and Information System. I am grateful to all my friends who made 
the times I spent in this university both rewarding and enjoyable. 
I wish to express my gratitude to all those who have supported and helped me 
throughout my master, and enabled me to present this work. I am very grateful to my 
parents, for their love, understanding and support at every step. Without them, I 
would never be able to accomplish all the things that I have done throughout these 
years. Finally, I would like to thank my siblings, specially my brother, Sagheb 
Koohpayeh Araghi, who has always been encouraging and helpful through the 
difficult moments of my life and my dear friends Sima Boujarian and Elham Majd 
for accompanying me in every moment, and Abang Abdul  Rasyid for translating the 
abstract in Malay. 
  
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
Implementing Ad hoc networks are becoming very prevalent during recent years. 
Security is the most important issue for developing mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). 
They expose to various kinds of attacks because of their unique nature in which every node 
can easily join to network or leave it. Black hole attack is the most probable attack in 
MANET. In this research we proposed a model for prevention of this attack. It judges on 
route replies coming from the intermediate node based on a trusted third party which is the 
destination node. If the source node received an acknowledgement on the route replies 
sending by an intermediate node, from destination during a specific time, it decides that the 
path is safe and intermediate node is not malicious. Meanwhile a counter will be set for 
counting the number of times that each intermediate node introduced a wrong route reply. 
Every node that proposes a wrong route reply will be recorded in a black list. The process 
also will be checked for all one hop neighbors of the suspicious node and the history of these 
nodes will be gathered in the black list, if they proposed a wrong route reply during the route 
discovery process. When the counter for each node exceed from a specific value, the 
suspicious nodes will be introduced as black holes and an alarm will be notified to all nodes 
in the network to remove these malicious nodes from their routing tables. Experimental 
results show that this model proposes a high rate of packet delivery ratio, with 88% 
improving network throughput compared with a network exposing in attack situation and 
decreasing the rate of end to end delay with 38% less than attack situation.   
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ABSTRAK 
Perlaksanaan rangkaian Adhoc menjadi sangat meluas sejak beberapa tahun 
kebelakangan. Keselamatan merupakan isu penting begi membangunkan rangkaian adhoc 
mudah alih (MANETs). Mereka tededah kepada pelbagai jenis serangan kerana sifat mereka 
yang unik di mana setiap nod boleh menyertai atau keluar dari sesebuah rangkaian dengan 
mudah. . serangan black hole ada serangan yang berkemungkinan besar untuk terjadi. Dalam 
kajian ini, kami mencadangkan satu model untuk mencegah serangan ini. Ia membuat 
keputusan berdasarkan maklumbalas nod yang dating dari nod pertengahan berdasarkan 
kerpercayaan pihak ketiga iaitu destinasi nod, Apabila sumber nod menerima maklumbalas 
mengenai rangkaian melalui node pertengahan oleh nod destinasi dari semasa ke semasa, ia 
kemudiannya akan membuat keputusan yang ia adalah jalan yang selamat dan nod 
petengahan adalah tidak berniat jahat. Sementara itu, pengiraan akan dilakikan setiap kali 
nod menggunakan maklumbalas yang salah. Setiap nod yang mencadangkan laluan yang 
salah akan direkodkan di dalam senarai hitam. Proses ini juga akan diperiksa untuk semua 
destinasi terus yang bersebelahan yang mencurigakan dan rekod nod ini akan dikumpul di 
dalam senarai hitam. Jika mereka mencadangkan maklumbalas yang silap semasa proses 
penenemuan laluan. Apabila pengiraan mereka untuk setiap nod melebihi nilai tertentu, nod 
yang mencurigakan akan diperkenalkan sebagai lubang hitam dan penggera akan 
dimaklumkan kepada semua nod dalam rangkaian untuk membuang nod yang berniat jahat 
dari laluan mereka. Keputusan eksperimen menunjukkan bahawa model ini mencadangkan 
kadar yang tinggi nisbah penghantaran paket, dengan 88% meningkatkan keupayaan 
rangkaian berbanding dengan rangkaian yang terdedah dalam keadaan serangan dan 
mengurangkan kadar penangguhan hujung ke hujung sehingga 38%. 
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CHAPTER 1 
            INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview  
Having an infrastructure less network was a desire that first developed in the 
1970s. Since then, the knowledge of both computers and radio communication has 
outstanding growth led to the inception of wireless network (Chandra, 2011). 
Instead of using physical cables, some kinds of radio frequencies in the air 
are utilized for data transmission in wireless networks. Wireless networks shaped by 
hosts and routers (Bala et al., 2010). 
They are categorized in wireless personal area networks (WPAN), local area 
networks (WLAN), and wide area networks (WWAN) based on their coverage area. 
Basic Service Set (BSS) is the essential building block of an 802.11 network, which 
is simply a group of stations that communicate with each other. While at least two 
stations communicate with each other, they considered as members of the basic 
service area (BSS). The 802.11 standard has two BSS modes. These are ad-hoc and 
infrastructure networks (Dokurer, 2006). Figure 1.1 illustrates these two types of 
networks. 
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Figure 1.1: Infrastructure Network and Ad-hoc Network (Dokurer, 2006) 
1.2 Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs)  
Ad hoc networks are a set of mobile nodes communicating with each other 
using multi-hop links. The networks that support ad hoc architectures are typically 
called mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) (Bala et al., 2010). 
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) includes wireless devices, generally 
called "nodes," that exchange data without having a central access point. Nodes are 
devices like, laptop, mobile phone, MP3 player, personal digital assistants (PDA) and 
personal computer taken part in the network and are mobile (Weerasinghe and Fu, 
2007). Figure 1.2 shows heterogeneous devices constitute a MANET. 
Such devices can communicate with the nodes within their radio range or 
outside their radio range via relay nodes. MANETs are adaptive and self organizing. 
Since they do not rely on any network entities, they can be formed on the fly without 
any extra infrastructure. There is an enormous heterogeneity between devices 
because any device equipped with wireless communication can connect to the ad-hoc 
network. Consequently, power consumption, storage, communication and 
computation and of these devices are various extremely (Chandra, 2011). 
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Figure 1.2: Heterogeneous mobile device ad hoc networks (Chandra, 2011) 
Routing and management are also performed cooperatively by each node in 
the network. Hence their transmission power is limited multi hop architecture is 
needed for communication of nodes through the network. In this architecture, each 
node works either as a host or as a router that forwards packets for other nodes that 
may not be in a direct range of communication. Nodes participate in an ad hoc route 
discovery protocol which figures out multi hop routes through the network between 
any two nodes.  They create routes among themselves dynamically to form their own 
wireless network on the fly (Weerasinghe and Fu, 2007). 
The popularity of MANETs is increasing rapidly since they do not depend on 
any pre-infrastructure and can be formed spontaneously. They grant an enormously 
flexible communication method for every situation with geographical or territorial 
constraints in which network system without any fixed infrastructure is necessary 
(Weerasinghe and Fu, 2007). 
Their application appears in managing natural disasters, battlefields, and 
historical places. Figure 1.3 shows the application of MANETs in a battle field (Wu 
et al., 2002).  
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Figure 1.3: Battlefields (Chandra, 2011) 
1.3 Background of the Problem 
In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes also execute the task of routers that 
discover and maintain routes to other nodes. This fact can be regarded as a vital 
weakness since a compromised node could provide erroneous information in 
forwarding traffic or simply preventing it. Furthermore, routing protocols are very 
fragile in term of security. 
Some causes of the problems related to the nature of MANET and its routing 
protocols are described as below. 
1.3.1 Infrastructure of ad hoc networks 
Lack of predetermined infrastructure in ad hoc networks, nodes compelled to 
deal with the routing of packets. Every node depends on the other neighboring nodes 
to route data packets (Deshpande, 2007).  
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1.3.2 Implicit trust relationship among neighbors 
Ad-hoc routing protocols assume that all participants are honest. This 
hypothesis allows malicious nodes to try to paralyze the network thoroughly , by 
providing incorrect information which breaks the principles of Network Security 
(Tsou et al., 2011). Hence the primary goal of routing protocols is to establish a safe 
and optimal route between participant nodes (Weerasinghe and Fu, 2007). 
Any attack in routing phase may distort the overall communication and the 
network can be paralyzed thoroughly. Therefore in comparison to their wired 
counterparts the  nodes in ad hoc networks are more vulnerable to security attacks 
(Anita and Vasudevan, 2010).  
1.3.3 Problems in relation to wireless communication 
Wireless channels have a weak protection to noise and signal interferences, 
so routing related in the control messages might be tempered. Broadcasting wireless 
channels permits malicious nodes to access to the network, eavesdrop and inject 
messages simply. A malicious intruder can spy on the channel and disrupt or alter the 
information within the network (Mohammed and Dargin, 2010).  
1.3.4 Dynamic topology of ad-hoc networks  
The mobility-aspect of ad-hoc network effects on the organization of nodes in 
MANETs because they included nodes that may change their locations frequently. 
Based on this fact, the dynamic topology of these kinds of networks, is a main 
characteristic that causes problems (Deshpande, 2007).  
Mobile Nodes change their position, therefore the network topology change 
dynamically. This fact allows any malicious node to connect to the network devoid 
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of detection (Tsou et al., 2011). Unattended nodes can be easily stolen. An attacker 
may use a stolen node for developing a malicious decoy, and set it close to the 
original nodes. This can result to impersonation and information exposure 
(Mohammed and Dargin, 2010).  
1.3.5 Restricted computing resources in MANET nodes  
Attacks can be planned to force nodes to exceed their bandwidth, processing 
power, RAM storage, or battery life restrictions. Routing table overflow and energy 
consummation are examples of such attacks (Tsou et al., 2011).  
1.4 Problem Statement 
The origin of the problem goes back to the route finding in routing protocols 
such as AODV and DSR in which not only the destination node can send a route 
reply message (RREP), but also an intermediate node who knows a valid route can 
send the RREP message to answer to the sender. An attacker that obtains a route 
request message (RREQ) can misuse of this problem by forwarding a RREP package 
to the sender, claiming that the destination node is a node which is only some hops 
away from the invader. Then the attacker will masquerade having the shortest path 
and be contained within the transmission route. All in all, the problem statement can 
be regarded as sending fake route replies (RREP) from a malicious intermediate 
node. This is possible either by pretending the shortest route or the highest sequence 
number (the highest sequence number represents the freshest route). The related 
attack trees shown in Figure.1.4 which illustrate the attack tree in detail in Figure.1.5 
(represented by a triangle) included the kernel of the black hole attack (Ebinger and 
Bucher, 2006). 
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Figure.1.4:  Black hole attack to isolate a node (Ebinger and Bucher, 2006) 
 
Figure.1.5: Attack tree of a black hole attack (Ebinger and Bucher, 2006) 
1.5 Project Objectives 
The objectives of this study are as below: 
 To explore existing models for preventing black hole attack in 
MANETs. 
 To propose and develop a model to prevent black hole attack in 
MANETs. 
 To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed model against black 
hole attack.  
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1.6 Research Questions 
The research questions of this study are as below: 
 How do current methods detect and prevent Black hole attack in 
MANETs? 
 How can we detect and prevent Black hole attack in MANETs? 
 How can we measure the performance of the proposed model against 
Black hole attack? 
1.7 Project Aim 
The aim of the study is to provide a model for preventing the black hole 
attack in MANETs. Firstly, studying the current algorithms regarding to the 
advantages and disadvantages of them, and investigating the criteria in which black 
hole attack misused, establish a safe route and detect the malicious node in an ad hoc 
network who disorders transmission of data by feeding wrong routing information 
(Agrawal et al., 2008); Then proposing a new model to overcome this kind of 
misbehavior routing.  
1.8 Scope of the Study 
The scope of this research is wireless mobile ad hoc network which focuses 
on the black hole attack in MANETs, related methods in prohibition and providing a 
secure model for preventing this kind of attack.  
Since, in contrast to wired networks, each node in an ad-hoc network 
forwards packets to the other peer nodes, the wireless channel is accessible to both 
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legitimate network users and malicious attackers. As a result, there is a blurry 
boundary separating the inside network from the outside world. Therefore routing 
protocols play an imperative role in the creation and maintenance of nodes 
connections. Although several secure routing protocols are proposed for security 
issues in MANET, the computation overhead involved in them is awful and often 
suffers from scalability problems. As a preventive measure, the packets can be 
signed carefully, but in black hole attack, the attacker can simply drop the packet 
passing through it. Therefore, secure routing cannot resist such internal attacks (Raj 
and Swadas, 2009). Hence, in this research, it is intended to use AODV, which is a 
very popular reactive routing protocol in MANETs. The software which is going to 
be used for this purpose would be the NS2 network simulator. 
1.9 Significance of the Study 
The black hole attack is one of the first active attacks in MANETs. It is very 
prevalent in ad hoc networks with the probability of 72% and damage of 60% 
(Ebinger and Parsons, 2009). Considering such problems, the necessity of study 
against black hole attack is observed essentially. By this research it is aimed to 
resolve some problems related to this attack and find a method for preventing it. 
1.10 Summary  
Mobile ad hoc networks are efficient because of easy and fast deployment. 
However they are very vulnerable compared with their wired peers. In this chapter, 
the most important challenges that MANETs faced described. Black hole attack is 
one of the most prevalent attacks in MANETs with a high rate of damage. Hence in 
this study, it is aimed to find a solution to defend against this attack.
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